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COMMENTS
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL IN WASHINGTON
INTRODUCTION

Puget Sound provides a disposal site for various municipal and industrial wastes. This Comment discusses the Washington Pollution
Control Commission's attempts to secure improved water quality in
the area. Because the pulp industry is the largest polluter in the
region,1 the Comment focuses more sharply on the Commission's activity in securing abatement from this industry.
Pulp and paper mills use vast quantities of fresh water each day for
processing and cooling.2 Ninety-five percent of this water is later discharged as waste, principally as sulfite waste liquor (SWL).3 The
resulting pollution is the equivalent of four times the total raw sewage
of the population of the state.4 A recent federal-state study indicates
that SWL is harmful to marine life,5 and that water circulation in most
northern Puget Sound disposal areas is not sufficient to remove the
abnormal deposits of SWL.8
SWL wastes may be substantially reduced by use of several available recovery processes. 7 In the common pulp process, wood is debarked and cut into chips which are placed in a digester with any one
'TRANscarT OF JoIr FEDERAL-STATE PouLTION CONTRoL CommmNcE 66 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as 1962 JOINT CONF.].
21962 JoINT CoNp. 272 (statement on behalf of the Northwest Pulp and Paper
Association).
'Two spellings are proper for sulfite. I have selected the one used in all the literature concerning pollution in Washington. In Wisconsin and in the eastern states it is
spelled sulphite.
'1962 JOINT CoNF.78. For the figures on each pulp mill in question, see id. at 69-74.
'The report was especially concerned with the effects of SWL on oysters, juvenile
salmon, flatfish eggs, bottom organisms, and plankton. In all cases SWL was found
harmful, although the toxic quantity varies between the various species of marine
life. To assure safety for all species a maximum SWL level of 10 parts per million
was recommended. This is substantially below current levels. See generally U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, NORTHiWEST REGIONAL OFFIcE & WASHINGTON STATE POLLUTION CONTROL COMPX'N, POLLUTIONAL EFFECTS OF PULP AND PAPER MILL WASTES IN
PUGET SOUND (1967) [hereinafter cited as REPORT).
'Id. at 67, 276, 300, 423. Guemes Channel is an exception, being "nearly ideal for
waste disposal." Nevertheless, by the shallow outfall area of the Georgia-Pacific pulp
mill dissolved oxygen approaches zero, thus endangering marine life, and a surface
patch of highly discolored water is present. Id. at 226, 231-32.
7
See REPORT 2-6; Charmichael, Forty Years of Water Pollution Control in Wisconsin: A Case Study, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 350, 404. Naturally the pulping and recovery
processes are far more complex than the discussion indicates.
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of a number of chemical solutions and cooked. After cooking, the
pulp is washed and then the chemical cooking liquors are either discharged into adjoining waters or recovered. The recovery systems
operate by evaporating and burning the pulping wastes, resulting in
recovery of some of the chemicals for reuse and heat for the pulp
mill's operations.'

I. FEDERALISM
Pollution control involves the process of federalism. The federal
government first enacted a comprehensive water pollution control act
in 1948. Since then the act has been amended four times, and each
amendment has strengthened the federal program.' As the act now
stands it has two main thrusts: (1) grants for construction and (2) a
demand for water quality standards for interstate waters.
Grants are authorized for "the construction of necessary treatment
works to prevent the discharge of untreated or inadequately treated
sewage or other wastes into any waters.. . ."'0 The grants are subject
to several limitations, but the most important are approval of the state
pollution control agency and contribution for thirty percent of estimated reasonable cost."
Under the act the governor or state water pollution control agency
was given until October, 1966 to file a letter of intent that before June
30, 1967 the state will adopt (1) water quality standards applicable to
interstate waters within the state and (2) a plan for implementation
and enforcement of the standards. If a letter is not received or the
standards are insufficient, the federal government is empowered to
adopt standards applicable to the interstate waters of any noncomplying state. 12 In so doing, the Secretary of Interior is required to consider "use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and
wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other
legitimate uses."' 3
On May 9, 1966 the Secretary of Interior sent a letter to the
8 Unfortunately,

some extent of air pollution results from use of a recovery system.
For a brief discussion of the Federal program as of 1962, see Stein, Problems and
Programsin Water Pollution,2 NATURAL REs. J. 388, 409-15 (1962). There is a useful survey of some of the problems in water pollution in STAFF REPORT OF SENATE
COMM. ON PUBLIC WORxs, 88th CONG., Ist SESs., A STUDY OF POLLUTION-WATER

(Comm. Print 1963).
" 33 U.S.C.A. § 466e(a) (Supp. 1966).
" 33 U.S.C.A. § 466e(b) (2) (Supp. 1966).
"-33 U.S.C.A. §§ 466g(c) (1),(2) (Supp. 1966).
" 33 U.S.C.A. § 466g(c) (3) (Supp. 1966).
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governor of each state with enclosed guidelines for setting standards
for interstate waters. Briefly the guidelines provide: (1) no standards
are acceptable which provide for less than existing water quality; (2)
no stream may be used primarily for transportation of wastes; (3) potential and future uses of streams must be considered; (4) a program
for upgrading water quality is necessary, as is (5) a plan considering
all relevant polluting sources and how the plan is to be implemented;
(6) no plan will be acceptable which allows any treatable waste to be
disposed without treatment; and (7) standards must be adequate to
protect and upgrade water quality in the face of future changes.1 4
Any pollution in interstate or navigable waters 5 which endangers
the health or welfare of any person is subject to abatement under the
act. When the navigable waters are entirely within one state, a governor or state agency may (1) request a joint conference on pollution
6
and (2) authorize federal enforcement.
The federal act, however, is of secondary importance in securing
abatement of pollution. Federal legislation has been predicated on the
theory that a state pollution control agency will be the primary enforcement organization in attempts to control pollution. Consequently,
the primary effect of federal legislation has been to stimulate effective
state programs of pollution control.
II. THE STATE EFFORT TO 1955
A fact finding program by the Departments of Health and Fish and
Game from 1925 to 1937 marked the beginning of a pollution control
program in Washington. In 1937 Governor Martin created a pollution
control commission consisting of the directors of the Departments of
Health, Fish and Game, and Conservation. With an initial budget of
$14,500 the commission commenced operations, pursuing two immediate objectives: (1) gaining immediate and practical results from
research, and (2) building a broad foundation for future work.lT This

11 U.S.

Dep't of the Interior Press Release, May 10, 1966.
'=Arecent Interior decision, Water Quality Standards-Interstate Waters Within
the Meaning of Section 10(c) Fed. Water Pollution Control Act, As Amended, 73 I.D.
181
(1966), held
that "coastal
in the
act included
waters
of the
within
the territorial
jurisdition
of waters"
the United
States
and all all
inland
waters
in seas
which
the
of
interthe
status
of
tributaries
is
ambiguous
on
tide ebbs and flows. The decision
state waters. They are not per se interstate, but if waste discharged into a tributary
reaches interstate waters and reduces water quality below the established standards,
to theofact.
subject
is the
tributary
then thewill
act. this time it is unclear what this latter
the At
operation
mean in
holding
1966). REPORT Or FIELD INVESTIGATIONS AND
§466g(d) COf
(1) (Supp.
a°33 U.S.C.A. CONTROL
PROGRESS
Isnb,
POLLUTIOH
RESEARcH 1 (1938).
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executive commission, with its emphasis on interagency cooperation
and concern with the polluting effects of SWL from the pulp and paper
mills, had much in common with the later statutory commission.
Pollution control bills were introduced in both the 1941 and 1943
legislatures, but neither passed.'" In 1945, however, the governor endorsed the legislation, and the legislature enacted the Water Pollution
Control Act.' 9 A statutory commission was created on the model of
the previous executive commission, but was expanded to include the
director of the Department of Agriculture 0 as well as a director who
was to be recommended by the Commission and appointed by the
governor." A broad policy section directed the Commission to maintain the "highest possible standards" of water quality consistent with
the various water uses of the state.2 The act vested the Commission
with full powers to promulgate rules and regulations," to determine
the conditions of the waters of the state,24 and to issue orders.2 ' A
"person aggrieved," however, was granted the right to an administrative hearing and a further trial de novo in superior court; all orders
were stayed during these proceedings.2 6 All plans for new sewage systems had to be submitted to the Commission for approval.
Finally,
violation of any provision of the act was declared to be a gross misdemeanor. 28 After the federal water pollution control legislation of
IS Interview with Mr. R. H. Bailey, in Seattle, Aug. 1, 1967. Mr. Bailey is managing director of Citizens for Clean Water, and was formerly president of the Pacific
Coast Oyster-Growers Association.
" WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.48 (1961).
' WASH. REv. CODE § 90.48.021 (1961).
Fish and Game by this time had been
divided into two departments.
A significant feature of the Commission is that there is no representation of
industry, especially the pulp industry, on it. Of the seven other states which have a
significant pulp industry, five allow an industry representative on their commission
and a sixth, Wisconsin, has a state advisory committee for the industry. Sulphite
Pulp Manufacturer's Research League, Progress Report No. 4, table 1 following p. 3
(Sept. 1, 1961).
'WASH.
Rxv. CODE § 90.48.023 (1961). The director is removable at the will of
the governor.
WASH. REv. CODE § 90.48.010 (1961):
It is declared to be the public policy of the state of Washington to maintain the
highest possible standards to insure the purity of all waters of the state consistent
with public health and public enjoyment thereof, the propagation and protection
of wild life, birds, game, fish and other aquatic life, and the industrial development of the state, and to that end require the use of all known available and
reasonable methods by industries and others to prevent and control the pollution
of the waters of the state of Washington.
WASH. REv. CODE § 90.48.035 (1961).
WASH. RFv. CODE § 90.48.070 (1961).
-WASH. REv. CODE § 90.48.120 (1961).
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.48.130 (1961). The only exception was emergencies "affecting the public health."
' WASH. RFv. CODE § 90.48.110 (1961).
'WASH.
REv. CODE § 90.48.140 (1961). The maximum penalties are a $100 fine and
one year in the county jail.
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1948,20 further sections were added to the Washington statute providing for cooperation with the federal government and other states.30
The Commission first met on July 9, 1945. Immediately its members
turned to public education concerning pollution, feeling that a program

creating an educated public was a necessity for success.

1

The program

32

was first directed at municipal officials rather than the general public
on the rationale that activities of public officials would educate the

public.
Shortly thereafter, however, the education program was expanded
to the general public. The slogan "Keep Washington Clean" was
instituted "for the purpose of enlightening the people of the state to the

necessity of pollution control."3 3 Other educational activities followed.
Commission speakers were always available and frequently addressed
interested private groups. In 1947 funds were expended to acquire a
booth at the Seattle Sports Show to draw attention to the various problems of water pollution.3 4 By the early fifties the Commission had
acquired a model sewage treatment plant which was sent to all the
fairs around the state.3 5 Sportsmen's clubs were one of the first groups
to actively support pollution control,3 6 and their support was welcomed even though they emphasized conservation to the exclusion of

health considerations.

7

Support from women's organizations was also

^62 Stat. 1155 (1948). The federal acts are discussed in text accompanying notes
9-16 supra.
WAsEL REV. CODE §§ 90.48.153, .156 (1961).
SPOLLUTION CONTROL COM ', PROGESS REPORT No. 15, at 1 (FEB. 1, 1948)
[Progress Reports of the Pollution Control Commission are hereinafter cited as
PROG. REP.].

PROG. REP. No. 1, at 1-2 (Oct. 3, 1945). Depending on the status of the municipality's planning for sewage construction, one of three letters was sent to municipal
officials. If the municipality had adequate sewage facilities the letter complimented the
officials on their farsightedness. If a program was beginning they were praised for a
good start and urged to complete the program quickly. If no action had been taken the
need for immediate planning was emphasized.
03Id. at 12.
" PROG. REP. No. 11, at 1 (June 2, 1947). Another reason was to draw particular
attention to the deplorable conditions around Seattle. For discussion of the Seattle
problem, see text accompanying notes 52-58 infra.
PRoG. REP. No. 39, at 1 (Dec. 1, 1955). The Progress Report indicates the Commission was pleased with the educational effectiveness of the model plant.
'Oyster-growers
also supported pollution control, but two factors differentiate
their efforts from other groups. First their motives were less than selfless, and second
they were concerned with the pulp industry and no one else. See text accompanying
notes 82-86 infra.
I PROG. REP. No. 15, at 2 (Feb. 1, 1948). The initial director of the Commission had a favorite analogy which he repeated all too frequently. He would discuss
how beautiful the waters of the state were years ago and then note that an Indian on
the warpath would have to kill many people before he created the danger to human life
that water pollution did.
Even if sports groups did ignore the human health implications of pollution in
their arguments, they were a powerful ally in pollution control. In Wisconsin, for
example, the Izaak Walton League of America, a conservation organization, lobbied
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actively sought and welcomed.38 While education was beneficial in
creating a general awareness of the problems of pollution,39 it did not
provide the specific impetus to convince an individual polluter that he
should abate.
The second fundamental premise of the Commission was cooperation.4" Possibly the best example of cooperation concerns the Commission and the pulp industry.4 Throughout its entire existence the
Commission has joined with the industry in conferences and joint surveys, trying to secure effective pollution abatement. Another aspect of
cooperation was the Commission's mediating efforts between municipalities and their industries to provide sufficient information to both
parties in hopes of avoiding misconceptions by either party. 42 As a
variant of the policy, the Commission felt that when a municipality
constructed sewage treatment works, the industry in the area, too,
should correct its pollution problems.43 In many instances cooperation
was successful. After World War II, extensive mooring of Navy vessels in Puget Sound produced pollution from both oil and raw sewage.
Commission discussions secured the removal of ex-war ships from Lake
Washington and ended the mooring of "live" ships in Discovery Bay
near Port Townsend.44
The Commission's inoffensive method of investigating a complaint
through strong pollution control legislation over the combined opposition of the pulp
industry, the dairy industry, the canning industry, the Wisconsin Council of Agriculture, the Wisconsin State Federation of Labor, and the League of Wisconsin
Municipalities! E. MURPHY, WATER PURITY 91-92 (1961).
' PROG. REP. No. 15 at 1-2 (Feb. 1, 1948).
'The Commission felt their program of education assisted the phenominal 20 to I
vote in favor of a sewage construction bond issue in Spokane where the sewage problem was extremely bad. See PROG. REP. No. 6, at 6 (Dec. 1, 1946).
40 The same premise worked successfully in Wisconsin. See generally E. MURPHY,
supra note 37, at 71-130. Cooperation is a natural concern for an interdepartmental
agency, and when achieved provides additional strength for the agency because the
varied talents of the several departments can be effectively applied to solving a particular problem.
The Commission was fortunate enough to achieve the needed interdepartmental
cooperation, and the director acknowledged this: "[T]he finest possible cooperation
has been achieved from the various other state departments concerned in connection
with our problems." PROG. REP. No. 4, at 19 (April 1, 1946) ; see also PROG. REP. No.
1, at 4 (Oct. 3, 1945). But see PROG. REp. No. 17 (June 1, 1948) where the Commission
dismisses the accomplishments of the previous executive commission and ignores the
fact that a history of interdepartmental cooperation had been established before 1945.
" The controversy with the pulp industry is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 68-123 infra.
" FROG. RP. No. 6, at 3 (Aug. 1, 1946) : "when both parties to such controversies
are properly informed of the problems involved, they are less apt to assume they are
being 'picked-on' for political reasons."
' PROG. REP. No. 7, at 2 (Oct. 1, 1946).
"FROG. REP. No. 4, at 14-16 (April 1, 1946). There were few subsequent complaints about oil pollution from Navy vessels. See PROG. REP. No. 5, at 2 (June 1,
1946).
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also was helpful in securing compliance. First there was an investigation, followed by consultation with the polluter; then recommendations
for improvements were agreed upon. And adequate checkups insured
that the improvements were constructed and working properly. 45 Initially all communications were answered and, where possible, specific
recommendations were made.46 Over time, however, the technical
problems became more complex and usually only general information
4
was supplied 7
The Commission stated that legal force was used only when cooperative methods failed, 48 but this is misleading. Properly stated, the
Commission did not use legal force; it merely applied pressure. The
formal legal actions authorized by the Water Pollution Control Act
were avoided either because the Commission lacked finances, 4 9 did not
feel ready to commence a vigorous application of the law, or was too
firmly committed to the policy of cooperation.
Prior to 1955 both municipalities and industries were under the same
provisions of the statute.5" When dealing with municipalities there is
the additional problem of convincing elected officials that any action
involving the expenditure of public funds is necessary; thus the idea
of applied pressure was probably the most feasible solution. In 1946
the Commission consistently prodded Bremerton to construct treatment facilities. Finally the city officials were issued a warning slip and
informed that definite steps were necessary.5 1 This achieved results.
Applying pressure to Seattle officials was less successful. In 1945 the
Commission undertook a study of pollution in Lake Washington, and
the results indicated a pollution problem, although it was not critical.
Two years later the Commission began criticizing Seattle's intransigent
elected officials. Without referring to Lake Washington the city maintained "that no raw sewage treatment is necessary because of the large
volume of water in Puget Sound available for dilution."5" The Commission felt that it was "beyond human comprehension" that the Sound
'7 See PROG. REP. No. 3, at 13 (Jan. 28, 1946).
1Id. at 12.
" Interview with the Honorable Charles B. Roe, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General
for Water Resources, in Olympia, Washington, Aug. 3, 1967.
"See PROG. REP. No. 36, at 1 (Aug. 1, 1954).

40By 1947 complaints had tripled and the Commission was beginning to worry
about finances. PROG. REP. No. 8, at 2-3 (Dec. 1, 1946). In 1947 the Commission requested $250,000, but received only $143,000 from the legislature. The Commission
announced activities would be curtailed and the staff reduced. See PRoG. REP. No. 10,
at 3-4 (April 1, 1947).
' On the changes in 1955 see text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
PRoG. REP. No. 5, at 16 (June 1, 1946).
PROG. REP. No. 14, at 1 (Dec. 1, 1947).
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could be so abused. 3 The forecast in 1947 was pessimistic: "If the
present condition is bad, the future condition will be intolerable and a
great danger to public health.""4 However, the city undertook no action and the Commission's forecast proved correct."
Unfortunately the city council, the mayor and the city engineer
could not agree on the issue of primary treatment." The Commission,
the Municipal League, and a committee chaired by attorney James
Ellis, however, moved toward a metropolitan solution to the sewage
problem. A comprehensive study of the Seattle area was initiated with
funds from the city, county, and state. 7 Finally in early 1958 the
voters approved a comprehensive sewage plan for the greater Seattle
area, and even before the election the Commission was making enthusiastic statements about Seattle's progress. 58 It is apparent, however,
that action from Seattle was long delayed, and applied pressure was
too ineffective. Furthermore, it was a citizen's organization, not elected
officials, who provided the impetus for action.
III. THE PERMIT SYSTEM
The Commission gained additional necessary authority in 1955.
The legislature enacted a statute requiring all industrial operations
which discharge any waste materials into the waters of the state to
obtain a permit from the Commission. 9 The permit could be permanent (five years) or temporary. Permits could be conditioned upon
maintenance of standards designed to prevent undue pollution of the
waters of the state in violation of the policy section of the 1945 statute."o The change in the law was significant because it shifted the
inertia inherent in previous procedure. Instead of waiting for a complaint and then investigating, the Commission was placed in a position
where industry came to them to request permission to discharge wastes.
The Commission continued its policy of cooperating with polluters
5 Id.
T
Id. at 2.
PROG. REP. No. 39, at 7 (Dec. 1, 1955). The result was that "[n]ot a single foot of
salt water shoreline, within the area and very little freshwater shoreline could be
considered safe for recreational or other uses involving bodily contact." 1962 JOINT
CONF. 217. Lake Washington was rapidly approaching a state of eutrophication
(permanent impairment). Id. at 218.
" Argus, March 6, 1954, at 1, col. 3-4. Cost was the chief issue.
"' The total cost of the study was $130,000. Seattle provided $90,000, the county
$30,000, and the state $10,000. See PROG. REP. No. 41, at 5 (Dec. 1, 1956).
' "Seattle is taking giant strides toward the cleanup of both fresh and salt water
areas." PROG. REP. No. 43, at 15 (Jan. 1, 1958).
' WAsH. REv. CODE § 90.48.160 (1961).
' WAsH. REv. CODE § 90.48.180 (1961).
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because the policy "created a favorable impression on the part of industry, and almost complete acceptance of the system."61 The Commission's procedure under the permit system was similar to the prepermit procedure: inspection of the plant; an evaluation of the pollution problem; requirements to meet the problem; and in many cases
a study of the adjoining waters. Thus, rather than using the new
authority to coerce immediate compliance with the policy of the state,
the Commission concluded that acceptance of the new system without
resort to the formal legal processes was the preferable method of
achieving pollution abatement.
With less significant polluters the informal process is usually effective. In general, staff members will conduct investigations and attempt
to convince the operator to take the necessary measures. Beginning in
1963 a new procedure was adopted. If cooperative attempts fail, a
staff member will inform the director about the problem, and then a
letter may be written from the Attorney-General's office which will
62
state that the violation may be a crime and is subject to abatement.
After the letter is sent the statutory procedure6 3 is readily available
and it, not cooperation or applied pressure, will be used.
By June, 1957, 70 percent of the industries had obtained permanent
permits; in 1958, 80 percent, and in 1963, 93 percent.64 The statistics
are impressive, and Murray Stein, chief enforcement officer of the
federal program, commented that in his opinion Washington had "one
of the best, if not the best, records of municipal and industrial compliance" in the nation. The record is far from perfect, however, because
by 1963 only 41 percent of the pulp mills had obtained permanent
permits. If the pulp industry is segregated from the other industries
the statistics are more meaningful: the pulp mills represent only 4.13
percent of the industrial operations in the Puget Sound area, yet the
mills account for 32 percent of the total noncompliance.6 7 It is therefore necessary to review the record of the Commission efforts concerning the pulp industry.
" PRoG. REP. No. 39, at 4 (Dec. 1, 1955). Cooperation was further enhanced by
incorporating industry suggestions in the permits whenever possible.
Interview with the Honorable Charles B. Roe, Jr., supra note 47.
SWASH. REv. CODE § 90.48.120 (1961): Notice by registered mail, the proper
waiting period (formerly 15 now 30 days), the order, and the administrative hearing.

PROG. REP. No. 43, at 1, 25 (Jan. 1, 1958) ; 1962 JoiNr ConF. 66.
' Hearings Before A Special Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1965).
'1 1962 JOINT CoixF. 66.
The only other group with less than 92% compliance was

miscellaneous at 84%.
Ed. Figures are extrapolated.
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IV. THE COMMISSION AND THE PULP INDUSTRY

A. Attempting to Secure Compliance
The pre-1945 executive commission was concerned with pollution
from SWL and immediately initiated a water quality monitoring program in Grays Harbor."s The commission also took an active interest
in construction of a magnesium oxide (MgO)-SWL recovery system at
the Weyerhaeuser plant in Longview. The statutory Commission continued this interest. 9 Hope for immediate pollution abatement in large
part rested on the success of the Longview conversion. Furthermore,
Weyerhaeuser advised the Commission "that a similar conversion will
be made at their Everett plant and has further indicated that this
7
[MgO] process will be available to all members of the industry."
Expectations increased and the Commission decided that if the Longview conversion were successful, they would meet with industry representatives and find out how long it would be before the whole industry
would convert to the new process7-although the Commission did note
that the conversion cost might be too great for smaller operations.72
The Longview plant was a success, but the Korean War intervened,
preventing the industry from obtaining necessary materials for converting the plants. 3 Nevertheless, Weyerhaeuser and Scott jointly
expended over $1 million to construct a deepwater diffuser at Everett
for their SWL discharge into Port Gardner Bay; no Commission order
74
forced this action.
After the Korean War, the Commission was unfortunately compelled
to spend increasing amounts of time and effort in convincing Seattle
officials to take action on their sewage problem; thus, to some extent
the pulp industry was ignored. The industry was not wholly idle,
however, and the Commission recognized this. After the 1955 permit
legislation, permit number one was issued to Weyerhaeuser's Everett
'See

POLLUTION CONTROL COMM'N, PROGRESS REPORT ON FIELD INVESTIGATIONS

AND RESEARCH (1938). The initial results showed: (1) a low dissolved oxygen
content in the waters; (2) that the ocean and tides provided little dispersion; and (3)
acute pollution existed until the first material increase in the stage of the river following the summer dry period.
PROG. REP. No. 12 (Aug. 1, 1947) is totally devoted to the problem of pollution
from SWL.
70

PROG. REP. No. 10, at 4 (April 1, 1947).

PROG. REP. No. 16, at 3 (April 1, 1948). During this period the Commission
was optimistic about solution of the pulp problem because it appeared the whole
'

industry was actively pursuing abatement.
2
' PROG. REP. No. 20, at 1 (Dec. 1, 1948).
1962 JOINT CONF. 83.

'See

col. 5.

PROG. REP. No. 29, at 9 (Dec. 1, 1951) ; see also Argus, May 11, 1962, at 4,
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plant "in recognition of the efforts of this company to control the
wastes from this operation."75
The permit system encouraged various pulp companies to reduce
their wastes. Crown Zellerbach (Camas) ,71 Weyerhaeuser (Cosmopolis and Longview)

77

Scott (Everett),78 and Rayonier (Grays Har-

bor)7 9'

all initiated major projects which assisted pollution abatement. s°
Approximately 25 percent of all these projects were initiated directly
for pollution control benefits. The remaining 75 percent were initiated
for other purposes, but did assist pollution abatement.8 " Unfortunately, almost all the major construction occurred at mills which were
not located on Puget Sound. Thus it becomes apparent why the focus
of the pollution problem of the pulp mills is in the Puget Sound area.
The oyster-growers were most concerned with pollution from SWL.
They felt that SWL was seriously harming their economic livelihood,
and they consistently pressed the Commission for immediate action.
In 1958 the Commission responded by requesting two outside consultants, acceptable to both the pulp companies and the oyster-growers,
to prepare a report on the effects of SWL upon oysters.
In early 1960 the Gunter-McKee Report8 2 was submitted, and it
immediately became a center of controversy. The two scientists had
conducted no direct investigations, but merely relied on information
gathered from various sources.8 3 Also the report was concerned with
oyster mortality in SWILs4 and not with other potentially harmful
effects of SWL on oysters such as reduced size or unmarketable
quality. The oyster-growers termed the report a "disaster,"ss since,

while not entirely vindicating the pulp companies, it was highly favorable to them. In fact, the report would have permitted a greater
PROG.

REP. No. 39, at 4 (Dec. 1, 1955).

Besides enlarging and modernizing an already effective Kraft recovery system,
the company began a water sampling system. The cost of all the expenditures was

$3.9 million.

PROG.

REP. No. 43, at 40-41 (Jan. 1, 1958).

' Weyerhaeuser spent $11.25 million in improving recovery systems, constructing

a sewage treatment plant, and measuring, sampling and analyzing wastes. Id. at 46-47.
Scott's various improvements cost $1.2 million. Id. at 45.
For $7.5 million the company constructed a sodium base recovery system to
recover at least 85% of all organic and inorganic solids. Form letter to all employees
from Geo. A. Holt, Resident Manager, Rayonier, Inc., Grays Harbor Div., Jan. 8,
1960 (on file in the Washington Law Review offices).
' Other companies made minor improvements. See, PROG. REP. No. 43, at 40-49
(Jan. 1, 1958).
PROG. REP. No. 43, at 50 (Jan. 1, 1958).
12G. GUNTER & J. MCKE, ON OYSTERS AND SuLFrr WASTE LIQUOR (1960).
83Id. at 3.
See, e.g., id. at 48.

Interview with Mr. R. H. Bailey. mPra note 18.
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amount of SWL discharge into the waters of the state than already
existed."
Nevertheless, the Commission was moving toward requiring full
abatement from the pulp companies which had not yet constructed
adequate recovery facilities. In the four years beginning in 1958 there
were 20 special committee sessions concerning pulping wastes.87 In
1960 the Commission issued new regulations governing pollution from
the pulp industry, 8 and these regulations were merely part of a
tougher Commission policy to insure "adequate recovery of settleable
solids to fully protect all water uses .. ."s Interestingly, the policy
was not in full accord with the Gunter-McKee Report as the Commission moved to insure there would be no increase in SWL levels.9"
New rules resulted in issuance of temporary permits for the mills
which lacked adequate recovery facilities: these permits containing
new and stringent standards. 9 ' The Commission was finally taking the
initiative authorized by the permit system. The mills were required to
begin construction of facilities similar to those built by other mills in
the state. The permits required recovery of 85 percent of the SWL, a
large but not impossible order. 2
The companies in question balked because they felt the changes
necessary would collectively cost them approximately fifty million
dollars." Previously cooperative, if not wholly active in pollution
abatement, they demonstrated the most fundamental weakness of the
'Pollution Control Comm'n, Digest of Reg. Meeting, at 6 (Sept. 6, 1960) [hereinafter cited as Digest].
Argus, May 11, 1962, at 4, col. 3.
Rule 04.252 (1960) (no longer in force) of the Commission provides:
(1) The general policy is to provide facilities to protect all water uses. (2) The
burden of proof is on the applicant in order to gain an increase in the amount of
SWL to be discharged. (3) To receive a permit the mill must show a system to
recover solids to be in operation within three years. (4) If no permanent permit
is issued, the mill must file plans for installation of recovery facilities of solids,
show that the existing system is adequate, or be in operation within three
years. (5) The Commission may offer evidence in support of conditions to the
issuance of the permit. (6) Intervenors are allowed in situations where their
interests are or may be affected by the proceedings.
Digest at 7.
' Id. See also letter from D. C. Ellsworth, Vice President of Columbia River
Paper Co. to Pollution Control Comm'n, Sept. 2, 1960 in Digest at 42. Mr. Ellsworth
felt the rules would prevent any additional construction of new mills or expansion of
existing mills. But see, Rule 04.252 (2), supra note 88, indicating Mr. Ellsworth was
in error.
"Cf. Sulphite Pulp Manufacturer's Research League, Progress Report No. 4, at 7
(Sept.
1, 1961).
"2 id. at 9. The "Report" notes that both the Kraft and MgO processes are at least
75% effective.
SArgus, May 11, 1962, at 4, col. 3. It should be noted, however, that five years
later a mill spokesman estimated the cost at $40 million. See Seattle Times, Sept. 6.
1967, at 31, col. 2. But see note 189 infra and accompanying text.
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Water Pollution Control Act. The companies requested an administrative hearing thereby insuring legally sanctioned delay while the
process moved to a final determination, probably by the state supreme
court. Furthermore, the objections to the temporary permits were so
numerous that a considerable delay appeared likely. In the words
of one non-legal member of the 4Commission staff, the objections
9
"include[d] ...the kitchen sink."
B. Legal Issues
The requests for a hearing by the various pulp companies created
the possibility of the initial court test of the permit system. In their
written applications for hearings the companies presented the legal
issues on which they might rely in the event of a court test. The
essential objections to the permits were constitutional; but these objections are without merit.9 5 Basically the pulp companies alleged
" 1962 JOINT CONF. 84.

'There were four other legal objections. One of the minor arguments is based on
CoNsr. art. XXI: "Public Use of Water. The use of the waters of this state
for irrigation, mining, and manufacturing purposes shall be deemed a public use."
The pulp companies contend that their use of the waters is a public use, and the permits would destroy this public use to benefit private persons. 1962 JoixN CoNF., apps.
B7, D4, E4. Even if correct the argument would still not be dispositive of the issue.
Anderson v. Superior Court, 119 Wash. 406, 205 P. 1051 (1922) established that the
declaration in art. XXI is not exclusive and does not preclude the legislature from
declaring other purposes to be public uses. The policy section of the Water Polution
Control Act can easily be construed as accomplishing this because it treats industrial
uses merely as co-equals with the other enumerated uses. Furthermore, in the recent
en banc decision in Botton v. State, 69 Wash. Dec. 2d 759, 420 P.2d 352 (1966) (4-1-4)
five of the judges specificaly emphasized the importance of recreational uses of water
to the state. (The four judges joining in the opinion of the court did not deal with the
problem.) Given Botton, there is little doubt that if the court faced the art. XXI issue,
it would hold that recreation on state waters is a public use.
The companies also alleged the requiring of permits constituted a taking of property without just compensation. Unfortunately, this argument rests on the fallacious
assumption that there is a vested right to pollute as much as one pleases. Furthermore, Snavely v. Goldendale, 10 Wn. 2d 453, 117 P.2d 221 (1941) presents an insurmountable obstacle to the argument. In Snavely the court held that pollution from a
city may assume the character of a "taking" of a downstream owner's land. See also
Sittner v. Seattle, 62 Wn. 2d 834, 384 P.2d 859 (1963).
Two non-constitutional contentions were also presented: (1) the Commission is
violating the policy section and (2) the Commission's standards are so inadequate
that even the Commission is unable to know the amount of abatement which will
result if the companies comply with the permits. The latter argument, even if correct
in 1962, is moot. The Commission now has the results of the five-year study, discussed in text accompanying note 158 infra, and the Commission must enforce the
standards promulgated under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. These standards are unlikely to be seriously questioned by a reviewing court.
The pulp companies have disagreed with the Commission's interpretation of the
policy section, i.e., that it is a clear mandate for an aggressive program of pollution
abatement. The pulp companies read the section as if it merely said: "Highest possible standards to insure the purity of all waters of the state consistent with... the
industrial development of the state." Thus when the pulp companies threaten to leave
the state, as they frequently did (see, e.g. 1962 JOINT CONF. apps. A, B, D), they can
argue that the Commission is violating the policy section. The section, however, is
WASH.
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(1) that RCW chapter 90.48 constituted an unlawful delegation of
legislative power, 6 and (2) that the orders in the permits deprived
them of property without due process of law under both the federal
and state constitutions. 7
The two essential criteria of the Washington supreme court in the
unlawful delegation cases are a declaration of legislative purpose and
some standards within the statute to guide administrative determinations." The Water Pollution Control Act satisfies both of these requirements, although it cannot be denied that the standards are not
explicit.99 The policy section, while ambiguous, does focus on a legislative desire to improve water quality whenever possible, and the sections governing general powers,' 0 0 determination of pollution, 1 ' and
issuance of permits °2 either explicitly or implicitly refer back to the
policy section as a guide for the Commission. Furthermore, one might
ask how, in 1945 or even in 1967, the legislature could draw more
explicit standards and still maintain sufficient flexibility? 0 3
not written with three dots in the middle, and contains more considerations than the
industrial development of the state. Even the Department of Commerce and Economic
Development (which is not represented on the Commission) concurs with the Commission's interpretation: "It is extremely important, however, that no one ... be permitted to destroy the usefulness of these waters for others." Id. at 165 (Statement of
Mr. Richard Beebe for the Department).
9 1962 JOINT COiNF. apps. B6, C18.
7
I at app. D3.
1d.
'See, e.g., In re Puget Sound Pilot's Ass'n, 63 Wn. 2d 142, 144, 385 P.2d 711, 712
(1963); Peterson v. Hagan, 56 Wn. 2d 48, 62, 351 P.2d 127, 135 (1960).
'In an original, if not convincing, example of drafting allegations, Rayonier
attempted to secure the best of all possible worlds. The company alleged: (1) that the
Commission's authority to issue permits has been "carefully circumscribed" and
under legislative standards a permit should issue automatically and (2) somewhat
incongruously in view of the previous statement, that there was an unconstitutional
delegation of authority because there are no standards! 1962 JoiNT CONF. app. C5,
C18.
"WASH. REV. CODE §90.48.035 (1961), as amended by Wash. Sess. Laws 1967,
ch. 13, § 6 (substantially unchanged on this point).
.01
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.48.070 (1961).
"0WASH. REV. CODE § 90.48.160 (1961).
"See City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Board, 5 N.Y.2d 164, 156 N.E.2d
301 (1959) (rejecting a similar argument under a statute with similar guidelines).
In Texas Co. v. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527, 533-34 (E.D. La. 1947), aft'd, 332 U.S
827 (1947) the court stated:
[I]t would have been impossible [considering the purpose and aim of the act] for
the Legislature to prescribe a formula for the Commission's guidance or to lay
down rules with reference to harmful pollution applicable to all waters: What
might be harmful pollution in one body of water might not be harmful pollution
in another. Of necessity, a determination of the facts of what might constitute
harmful pollution was left to a fact-finding group. The Legislature was compelled
to create an agency to administer the act.
See also the guidelines for the Secretary of the Interior if he promulgates water
quality criteria for interstate waters: "use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial and
other legitimate uses." 33 U.S.C.A. § 466g(c) (3) (Supp. 1966).
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The court also has recognized two additional considerations in unlawful delegation cases. The first is the length of time a statute has
been applied without a constitutional challenge, 1 4 and the Water
Pollution Control Act was enacted in 1945. The second consideration
is the feasibility of a legislature which meets for 60 days every other
year handling the problem itself.0 5 "The legislature may... delegate
to a Commission the power to do some things which it might properly,
but can not advantageously, do itself."'10 Pollution control is a clear
example of an area where the legislature could not solve the continually changing problems, and must delegate authority to an expert
agency-which itself is unable to solve many of the problems. If there
were no Pollution Control Commission it would be impossible to have
even a semblance of pollution abatement and improved water quality.
The fourteenth amendment due process argument as applied to the
Water Pollution Control Act is obviously frivolous. Beginning with
the West Coast Hotel decision 0 7 overruling Adkins v. Children'sHospital,' the Supreme Court has permitted the states to regulate their
industry as they chose with the "wisdom and utility of legislation" left
to the state legislatures where the responsibility belongs. 9
On the state level, substantive due process continues to have some
vitality."0 However, even though there is dictum to the contrary,"'
...
In re Puget Sound Pilot's Ass'n, 63 Wn. 2d 142, 385 P.2d 711 (1963) (court
found it significant that there had been no previous constitutional challenge of a
26-year-old statute).
' Frach v. Schoettler, 46 Wn. 2d 281, 287, 280 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1955); Vail v.
Seaborg, 120 Wash. 126, 130, 207 P. 15, 16 (1922) ; Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113
Wash. 359, 364, 194 P. 595, 597 (1920).
10Spokane Hotel, supra note 105, at 364.
" West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
s261 U.S. 525 (1923).
" Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
"See Comment, Distinguishing Eminent Domain from Police Power and Tort,
38 WAsn. L. REv. 607 (1963). The Comment is principally concerned with cases
which border between police power and eminent domain. The author suggests the
court makes an independent determination of whether "the benefit conferred upon the
public warrants... [the] degree of infringment upon private property interests." Id.
at 613. Furthermore, he erroneously suggests the court should do this. Although he
mentioned deference to the legislature, the author failed to elaborate the point and
leaves the reader wondering why the court should be substituting its judgment for the
legislative determination.
See also Washington v. Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Co., 90 Wash. 416, 430-31, 156
P. 837, 842 (1916) :
It may be true that the act is burdensome, and will prevent many from engaging
in this form of traffic who would otherwise engage therein.... These... are not
questions for the consideration of the courts. With the courts the question is one
of power, not one of policy. The courts cannot overthrow statutes ... because in
the opinion of the judges they could or should have been made less rigorous.
'Peterson v. Hagan, 56 Wn.2d 48, 53, 351 P.2d 127, 130 (1960) : "We reject
flatly the argument that the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and
state constitutions do not apply to statutes enacted in exercise of the police power."
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most Washington decisions indicate that legislation passed pursuant to
the police power is not limited by any concept of substantive due
process under the state constitution. 112 Frach v. Schoettler n" amply
demonstrates the analysis used in due process cases:" 4 plaintiff has the
burden of proof against a presumption that the statute is in the interest
of the public welfare; there is an expansive definition of the police
power;" 5 finally the court asks: is the method selected in the legislation reasonably related to the police power goals? Once the question is
answered the constitutional inquiry is ended. There is no doubt that
the Water Pollution Control Act is police power legislation,"' and
therefore the sole issue is the reasonable relation. Sittner v. Seattle"7
is dispositive of the issue. In Sittner the court upheld Seattle's air
pollution ordinance over due process arguments where plaintiffs alleged that compliance would drive them out of business. The court
stated that economic hardships, without more, cannot affect constitutional validity."' Thus the substantive due process argument under
the state constitution is without merit. Other actions, however, shifted
the focus from the legal issues to Federalism.
V. AcTioNs

SINCE

1962

A. The Federal-StateConference
While the Commission and the pulp companies were attempting to
narrow the issues to be presented at the hearing, Governor Rosellini
The statement is wholly correct in its reference to the equal protection clause, but this
dicta as to the due process clause was gratuitous-and erroneous-because the court
was faced with an equal protection problem. Only equal protection cases were cited to
support the proposition, and the majority (there was an intelligent and scathing dissent) proceeded to decide the case on traditional equal protection grounds: "This is
not classification or even an attempt at classification." Id. at 58, 351 P.2d at 133.
1'-2Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wn. 2d 629, 634-35, 289 P.2d 203, 206 (1955);
Frach v.
Schoettler, 46 Wn. 2d 281, 280 P.2d 1038 (1955) ; Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash., 143, 53
P.2d 615 (1936); Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Brown, 109 Wash. 680, 187 P. 399
(1920). For purely procedural interpretations of the due process clause see Gnecchi v.
State, 58 Wn. 2d 467, 364 P.2d 225 (1961) and State v. Cater's Motor Freight System,
Inc., 27 Wn.2d 661, 179 P.2d 496 (1947).
"'46 Wn.2d 281, 280 P.2d 1038 (1955).
..The court does apply the arbitrary and capricious test in due process cases,
however. This, of course, necessitates less analysis. See State v. Spino, 61 Wn. 2d
246, 377 P.2d 868 (1963) ; Kelleher v.Munshull, 11 Wn. 2d 380, 119 P.2d 302 (1941).
"' "[T]here isnot doubt that the state, in the exercise of such power, may prescribe
laws tending to promote the health, peace, morals, education, good order, and welfare
of the
people." 46 Wn. 2d 281, 285-86, 280 P.2d 1038, 1041 (1955).
6
" See United States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Shirely
v. New Hampshire Water Pollution Comm'n, 100 N.H. 294, 124 A.2d 189 (1956);
City of Huntington v. State Water Comm'n, 137 W.Va. 786, 73 S.E.2d 833 (1953).
"762 Wn. 2d 834, 384 P.2d 859 (1963).
"8 The court's language also disposed of the "taking" issue, note 95 snpra. Id. at 839:
The plaintiffs contend that compliance with the ordinance makes it economically
infeasible for a continuation of their business and that the ordinance is there-
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requested a joint Federal-State Conference concerning pollution in
Puget Sound and the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The Conference met
January 16-17, 1962, and extensive testimony was received from the
Commission, various state agencies, the pulp industry, two labor unions, a sportsman's group, oyster-growers, and others." 9
The testimony not only illuminated many of the pollution problems
of the Puget Sound area, but also reflected attitudes of many of the
conflicting interests. The most interesting of the attitudes was the
parochial view expressed by the two labor spokesmen. One of them
summed up the pulp workers' union's position explicitly: "My concern
is solely with the ten thousand people I represent." 20 The other
spokesman was not as blunt, but his message was essentially identical:
the employees and their families were "totally and completely financially dependent upon the continued operation of the mills," and
naturally the threats to close the mills worried him.12 Thus, both labor
and management were affirming a similar position which, of course,
could place the Commission in a politically unhappy position. Also
illuminating were the continually diametrically opposite views of the
pulp industry and the oyster-growers on the problems of the oyster
industry. The latter contended that sulfite waste liquor was a major
cause of their problems, 22 while the former placed the blame on poor
conservation procedures. 23
B. The Five Year Study and FederalStandards
The principal conclusion of the conference was that pollution abatefore oppressive and a taking of their property without due compensation. Economic hardships often inevitably result from laws and ordinances enacted or
adopted for the protection of the public health and welfare; this, however, cannot
affect their constitutional validity unless they are shown to be clearly unreasonable and discriminatory.
"See generally 1962 JOINT CONF.
'Id. at 263 (emphasis added). This was not, of course, the first time union representatives had spoken on behalf of their employers. See, e.g., Minutes of the
Pollution Control Comm'n Meeting, May 18, 1960, at 18-19. A field representative of
the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers stated:
.... I do know that scientists, if they err, invariably err on the conservative, or safe,
side. [Then referring to the Gunter-McKee Report,] I can only deduce that the industry is doing an outstanding job in the abatement and control of pollution." A union
president stated: "Certainly this [pulp] is an industry that I don't think should be
jeopardized by oyster growers or anyone else."
1962 JoINT CONF., at 193, 195.

Id. at 235-36.
20Id. at 282, 305-09. In fact, most fisheries problems were blamed on poor conservation. Id. at 298-305. Five years later the industry's position was unchanged. When
confronted with the results of the Federal Report, confirming the oyster-growers contentions, pulp spokesmen labelled the Report unscientific. Seattle Times, April 26,
1967, at 7, col. 4-7.
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ment measures taken by the pulp industry were inadequate. 12 4 To help
remedy this problem, a joint federal-state investigation, to last for five
years, was initiated to conduct: (1) in-plant studies at each mill in
question, (2) oceanographic studies to determine dispersion and persistence of pollution in relation to currents and tides, (3) biological
and related chemical studies of the marine environment, and (4)
12 5
studies of all sources of wastes discharged into the study area.
The five year study was essentially a federal, rather than a state or
cooperative, project. The $1,500,000 of direct financial assistance was
provided by the federal government. The Commission, however, did
provide considerable assistance through the use of its personnel in
staffing the study. The projects undertaken by the study were determined by a technical staff of both federal and state officials, but they
nevertheless bear a substantial imprint of past work and investigation
by the Commission. Of course the problems discussed at the 1962 joint
1 26
conference provided a considerable focus for the study.
The five year study resulted in a reprieve for the pulp companies
from the temporary permits of 1961, because the Commission decided
that final decisions of the requirements for the disposal of SWL would
be deferred until field investigations were completed. 7 However, the
pulp mills were required to make certain immediate corrections which
the Commission deemed feasible. The most noteable of these were at
Weyerhaeuser's Everett plant where the company spent over $100,000
to reduce fiber losses by 50 percent and suspended solids in the
12 8
hydraulic barker effluent by 85 percent to 90 percent.
As the five year study approached its conclusion, the Commission
began work toward preparation of standards for interstate waters to
comply with the new federal legislation.' 2 9 Initially the required letter
of intent was written; then the Commission held public hearings
throughout the state. The hearings were informational only. The
Commission was attempting to solicit public comment on the proposed
121
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standards. Finally there was a rule-making hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act, 130 and on June 29, 1967, the standards
were promulgated with all inconsistent regulations being repealed.' 3'
Although they were modified slightly, the standards were approved in
December 1967.
The five year study assisted greatly in drafting the standards. The
study, with its complete federal financing, secured data that would
have been unavailable for years had the Commission been forced to
delay until adequate state finances were forthcoming.
The standards created four separate classes of waters, ranging from
AA ("extraordinary") to C ("fair"). Class AA characteristic uses are
water supply, recreation, wildlife habitat, and fish and shellfish reproduction, rearing, and harvest. The Class C uses are more limited and
of an industrial nature. 2 The two intermediate classifications are by
far the more prevalent, 33 and their uses combine the two other classifications.
The Commission has announced that existing waste discharges which
conflict with the standards shall be modified to conform as expeditiously as possible, which at the latest is to be five years. "Exceptional
cases," however, may be granted a longer period to conform. 4 Thus
while the five years from 1962 through 1967 have been devoted largely
to studying the effects of pollution and preparing standards, the next
five years apparently will involve an increasing amount of inspection
and enforcement activities.
VI. THE 1967 AMENDMENTS
Before the final report of the five year study was completed, the
1967 legislature, responding to Commission needs and the impetus of
the new federal legislation, strengthened the Water Pollution Control
Act by enacting two separate statutes. 35 Just as the permit system
of the 1955 legislation shifted the inertia of the law toward a stronger
policy of pollution control, the 1967 amendments added considerable
force to the policy. The essential framework of the act remains unW.sH. REv. CODE ch. 34.04 (1959).
"'See generally, Water Quality Standards for Interstate and Coastal Waters, Pollution Control Comm'n Regulation, June 29, 1967.
' Id. at 3, 6. See appendix infra.
"mOf the 64 areas classified 7 are AA, 39 are A, 15 are B, and 3 are C. Water
Quality Standards for Interstate and Coastal Waters, Pollution Control Comm'n Regulation, supra note 131, at 7-13.
"o

1:1Id. at 17.

Wash. Sess. Laws, 1967, ch. 13; Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1967, ch. 139.
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changed,' 36 but the additions provide new powers for the Commission,
and correct several substantive difficulties in the old legislation.
One of the most significant changes made by the new statute was the
repeal of RCW section 90.48.130 which provided for a stay of Commission orders during a hearing and appeal. Prior to the repeal of
this section, a significant polluter may have found the delay while an
order is stayed to be worth the expense of challenging a Commission
order. The new amendments cover the problem of repeal in two separate sections. One provides that the Commission shall not stay an
order unless in its discretion the Commission determines that a stay
would not be detrimental to the public interest. 1 7 The decision not to
stay an order is appealable, however. The other section explicitly provides that the APA shall apply to all proceedings under the Water
Pollution Control Act."

8

At the time the amendments were passed the change meant that a
Commission determination could be reversed only (assuming jurisdiction, fair procedure, and no error of law) if the order was either
"unsupported by material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted" or arbitrary and capricious." 9 Later during
the session, however, the legislature amended the APA and changed
...
In fact, many provisions of the old act remained either unchanged or substantially unchanged. The policy section was unchanged. The broad definitions of person
and waters of the state, WAsH. REv. CODE § 90.48.020 (1961), were unchanged, but an
expansive definition of pollution was added to the section. Wash. Sess. Laws 1967,
ch. 13, § 1. Other substantially unchanged sections include the requirement of a waste
discharge permit, WASH. REV. CODE § 90.48.160 (1961), and the authorization of
cooperation with the federal and other state governments. WASH. REv. CODE
§§90.48.153, .156 (1961).
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.48.190 (1961) pertaining to the termination of permits was
also substantially unchanged, but a problem of construction remains under the section.
A permit may be terminated if the Commission finds: (1) procurement by misrepresentation of any material fact or lack of full disclosure; (2) violation of the permit; (3) a material change in the quantity or type of waste discharged. It seems
clear that any one of the three conditions is grounds for termination of a permit, but
unfortunately the section is not written in the disjunctive. The section is simply
poorly drafted, and if a court required all three conditions to be met, the provision
would be nullified because it is unlikely all would be present in a given case. Hopefully a court will construe the section as if it had been written in the disjunctive.
Lastly, the permit section, WASH. REV. CODE § 90.48.160 (1961) as amended by
Vash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 13, still refers to "commercial or industrial operation." The Commission has interpreted this to include agricultural use, but there is
some doubt if this construction is correct because WASH. REv. CODE § 90.48.020
(1961) as amended by Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 1 refers to "commercial, industrial, [and] agricultural ... uses" which implies that the legislature distinguishes
between the various uses. It would be helpful if the legislature would amend the
section to clarify this confusion. It must be emphasized, however, that the issue is
permits, not jurisdiction. The Commission's jurisdiction over agricultural uses is
clear. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.48.030 (1961).
" Wash. Sess. Laws, 1967, ch. 13, § 12.
"s Wash. Sess. Laws, 1967, ch. 13, § 21.
.. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 34.04.130 (6) (e), (f) (1959).
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the substantial evidence test to "clearly erroneous in view of the entire
record as submitted and the public policy contained in the act of the
legislature authorizing the decision or order."'1 40
Although the Washington supreme court has never elaborated the
difference between the substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious tests under the APA, it has recognized a distinction.14 The
definition of arbitary and capricious is stringent, and the court has
noted "it would seem safe to predict that it would be a rare occasion to
find" arbitrary and capricious action.142 Substantial evidence, as the
court has developed the test, is evidence "which would convince an
unprejudiced, thinking mind of the truth.., to which the evidence is
directed."' 43 Unfortunately the court has not used the clearly errone1 44
ous test, but many state courts have accepted the classic formulation
of the United States Supreme Court in the United States Gypsum
case:. 4 5 "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Thus the clearly erroneous test allows more review than the
substantial evidence test, although the former may provide more clarity on the scope of review. 46 It is not clear exactly what the legislature
intended by inserting the clause concerning agency policy. It could be
construed as an open invitation to substitute a judicial judgment for an
administrative determination. However, the section does not provide
for a de novo trial, and one may query whether the legislature intended
"0 Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 237, § 6(6) (e). The impetus for this change' was
the extensive lobbying efforts of "a large part of the pulp industry-not including
Weyerhaeuser" according to Senator Wilbur Hallauer. See Argus, March 24, 1967, at

1, col. 4.

..
1 Northern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 69 Wash.

Dec.
2d 474, 481, 418 P.2d 735, 739 (1966).
1

"'Id. Obviously "no talismanic words" can solve the process of judging whether
action is arbitrary and capricious. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.

474, 489 (1951). The Washington supreme court has provided a definition, however,
vhich indicates the standard to be applied in determining whether action is arbitrary and capricious: willful and unreasoning action without consideration and
regard for facts and circumstances. Northern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Washington Util. &
Transp. Comm'n 69 Wash. Dec. 2d 474, 418 P.2d 485 (1966); Miller v. Tacoma, 61
Wn. 2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963); Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wn. 2d 629, 289 P.2d 203
(1955). But "where there is room for two opinions action is not arbitrary and capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be
believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached." Miller, supra; Smith v.
Hollenbeck, 48 Wn. 2d 461, 294 P.2d 921 (1956).
" Arthurs v. National Postal Transp. Ass'n, 49 Wn. 2d 570, 577, 304 P.2d 685, 690
(1956
"' e 2 F. COOPER, STATE AmNMIuSTRATnva LAiw 726 n.259 (1965).
"'United States v. United States Gypsum
"'See COOPER, supra note 144, at 724-30.

Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 43 : 425

to subvert its earlier determination favoring a speedy administrative
adjudication by encouraging recourse to lengthy judicial procedures.
The section appears to require a judicial opinion on what the policy
section of an agency statute means, and then a subsequent determination of whether the agency decision in implementing that policy is
"clearly erroneous." The court should remember, of course, that a
highly technical record demands an exercise of expert judgments, and
therefore the new section should not be interpreted as vesting this
expertise in the court.
Another significant change is an additional penalty section 14 7 which
should assist enforcement of the act. The new section operates on anyone who either violates a waste discharge permit or who operates without one when required. There is a penalty of $100 per day for each
violation, and each violation is a separate offense. The director of the
Commission must send a written notice of the penalties incurred, and
upon receipt of such notice by the violator the penalties become due.
The attorney general is authorized to bring an action to collect the
penalty if unpaid after 15 days. If vigorously enforced this section
should secure rapid compliance from less significant polluters who cannot afford the costs of a violation; in fact, threat of such action will
While a larger polluter will not be deterred
probably be sufficient.'
by the costs, if the Commission attempts to seek publicity concerning
such actions the publicity may provide considerable impetus to comply
with the act.
Coupled with the new penalty provision is a tax credit plan 14 9 for
facilities installed "for the primary purpose" of pollution abatement.""
After securing a certificate from the Commission, the operation is entitled to a tax exemption or credit of two percent cumulatively per
year of the total cost of the facilities as long as the certificate is in
force. 51 Such credit may not cumulatively exceed 50 percent of the
total cost nor 50 percent of the excise taxes payable in a year.1 5 2 The
§ 14.
"But see, Charmichael, Forty Years of Water Pollution Control in Wisconsin:
389-95.
The Wisconsin act provides for severe
A Case Study, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 350,
penalties, and consequently the courts are rather lenient toward violators.
Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1967, ch. 139.
"
Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1967, ch. 139, § 1(1) (b). There may be considerable difficulties with the "primary purpose" language. As noted in text accompanying note 81
supra, much of the construction provides only secondary pollution abatement benefits,
and yet one would presume that the legislature intended to include these facilities
within the statutory coverage.
...
Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1967, ch. 139, §§ 5, 6.
"-Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1967, ch. 139, §§ 6(2) (a), (c). Excise taxes are defined
as business and occupation, use and public utility taxes.
...Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1967, ch. 139,
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credit also is reduced by the amount of the federal investment credit. 5 '
A questionable, but interesting, feature of the statute is that existing
facilities also qualify for the credit, although the credit is applied only
154
to the depreciated value of the facilities.

By consolidating two sections of the old act,'55 the amendments
clarify the problem of injunctive relief under the act. Previously the
act allowed "an appropriate action at law or in equity" to carry out the
provisions of the act, but the power was inserted in a section declaring
a violation of a Commission determination to be unlawful. 5 6 A further
section provided for injunctive relief in cases of emergency. 1 57 Thus
the act could have been construed as limiting injunctive relief to
emergencies, although the legislature probably was simply cautious and
thereby explicit in providing for injunctive relief in one case, while still
authorizing it in other cases. In any event the amendments leave no
doubt about the status of injunctions. A new section 58 was added
which provides for an "appropriate action at law or in equity, including an action for injunctive relief" to carry out the provisions of the
act. Although this is probably not a substantive change in the law, the
clarity will prevent future difficulties.
The most intriguing section in the amendments is the summary
abatement section. 59 Notwithstanding any other provision of the
Water Pollution Control Act, if it appears to the director of the Commission "that water quality conditions exist which require immediate
action to protect the public health or welfare," he may issue an order,
without any prior notice or hearing, which affords the polluter an alternative of either (1) immediately discontinuing or modifying the discharge or (2) appearing before the Commission. If the polluter elects
the latter, he must not be afforded less than 24 hours notice. Then at
the end of the hearing, if a majority of the Commission agree with the
director, a written order shall be issued and no court may stay the
order unless the court finds the Commission to have acted arbitrarily
Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1967, ch. 139, § 6(2) (d). The credit in Washington will
be based on a higher figure because the statute is written in terms of total cost which
will include labor.
I See Wash. Laws Ex. Sess., 1967, ch. 139, § 6(1). Presumably the tax credit was
intended to provide an incentive to encourage future construction of pollution abatement
facilities. If the assumption is correct, one may query why the statute applies retroactively because in cases where facilities already exist, no incentive was necessary.
'WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 90.48.060, .080 (1961).

1 WASH.

'WASH.

§ 90.48.080 (1961).
REV. CODE § 90.48.060 (1961).
REv. CODE

Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 7.
Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 22.
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or capriciously. However, the order is subject to review in the same

manner as any other order.
The principal problem under the summary abatement section is
ascertaining the type of hearing the polluter will receive if he elects not
to discontinue immediately. The fact that this is a summary abatement
section and the situation "requires immediate action" indicates that
the hearing should be more rapid than under normal procedures. To
this end the statute provides that 24 hours notice is sufficient. However, is this the only difference?' 60 May the hearing itself be summary? The section provides little assistance on this point. Clearly the
section would be more effective-and no less constitutional"-if, in
light of a situation requiring immediate action, the Commission were
able to hold a summary hearing. As soon as the situation lost its
emergency nature a full hearing could be held with a more elaborate
record for a reviewing court. Because the section operates "notwithstanding the other provisions" of the act and applies to an emergency
situation, the section should be interpreted to allow the Commission to
hold a summary hearing. However, the language of the section does
not compel such a conclusion, and it is uncertain how the Commission
and the courts will interpret it.
The Commission was granted the necessary power to subpoena
witnesses and records in rule-making proceedings, in contested cases,
and in considerations of applications for waste discharge permits or
their termination or modification. 2 The only limitations within the
section are: (1) the subpoena must relate to the matter under consideration and (2) no trade secrets need be divulged. If an individual
refuses to comply with the Commission's subpoena "it shall be the duty
of the superior court of any county... to compel obedience by proceedings for contempt."
The provisions on standing have been noticeably expanded by the
amendments. Previously the standard had been "any person who shall
feel aggrieved."' 6 3 The new standard incorporates the "feels aggrieved" concept, but also explicity provides that the party need not
" Thirty days notice is necessary for a normal termination. Wash Sess. Laws
1967, ch. 13, § 17. The decision not to stay is appealable.
An ambiguous statement by Senator Wilbur Hallauer provides the rationale for a
conclusion opposite to mine on the scope of summary abatement. See Argus, March
24, 1967, at 5, col. 3.
..
2 Gnecchi v. State, 58 Wn. 2d 467, 364 P.2d 225 (1961).
11 Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 9.
" WAsH. REV. CoDE § 90.48.130 (1961).
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have an economic interest in the proceedings.!6 4 The party must
demonstrate, however, the manner in which the order affects him.
Under this broader definition of standing, members of conservationist
organizations will be able to contest Commission permits which they
believe to be insufficient. To supplement the new standing provisions,
any application for either a new permit or increased waste discharge
must be publicized twice in a newspaper of general circulation within
the appropriate county and in any other information media which the
Commission may select so that interested parties may present their
views to the Commission. 5 An application for a mere renewal permit,
however, need not be publicized.
The legislature did make an effort to assist municipalities in constructing new sewage treatment facilities. It granted the Commission
power to administer grants subject to four qualifications:1 66 (1) grants
are matching only, but a municipality's share includes any money
received under a federal grant; (2) no grant shall be made for a
project not qualifying for a federal grant; (3) no grant shall be made
for a project which fails to conform to a comprehensive basin plan if
such a plan has been adopted; (4) a recipient must meet any qualifications and procedures which the Commission may establish. The legislature also authorized a $25 million bond issue to provide the initial
matching money. 6 7 The Commission, however, determined that the
maximum state grant will be only 15 percent of total eligible project
cost until more funds from both the state and federal governments are
available.'
Under the old act the Commission had only two sections which
allowed it to attempt to abate pollution by a municipality.'6 9 Issuing a
written order to a municipality was not used, and instead the Commission sought to secure abatement through cooperation or applied pressure. This left the Commission with only one operative section: reviewing and approving all plans for sewage systems and disposal or
treatment works. Thus, because it was unwilling to issue enforceable
written orders to municipalities, the Commission reduced its powers to
a largely negative function of approving or disapproving new construction. The new amendments greatly increase the Commission's powers
Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 12.
Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 15.
a Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 28.
" Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, c. 106.
Interview with the Honorable Charles B. Roe, Jr. supra note 47.
1
WASH. REv. CoDE §§ 90.48.110, .120 (1961).
'

"

WE1ASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 43 : 425

with respect to municipalities. Starting with the old section as a base,
one amendment provides that municipalities and all others constructing sewage systems must submit, in addition, their proposed method of
future operation and maintainance of the system.'
The Commission
may not approve any plans unless it is satisfied that the plans are adequate to protect the quality of the waters of the state' 7 ' This section
should insure that all new housing developments provide their residents with adequate sewage systems.
New sections have been added which grant the Commission a positive role in gaining treatment from municipalities. These sections
sanction the Commission: (1) to delineate and establish sewage drainage basins in the state; 172 (2) prepare and/or adopt a comprehensive
water pollution control and abatement plan for each basin after notice
and a public hearing; and (3) "require compliance with such plan by
any municipality" or other person operating or constructing a sewage
collection, treatment, or disposal system within the basin.'
Thus the
Commission now has positive powers which it may exercise to force
municipalities to protect the water quality of the state. The immediate
effect of the changes is more limited, however, and probably they
initially will be used to implement the state's new construction grant
program.
A minor, but indicative, change was made in the section governing
the issuance of permitsY.4 Previously a permit would issue if the
Commission found that the waste disposal would not "unduly pollute"
the waters of the state in violation of the policy section of the act. On
its face the language of the section creates the anamolous situation
where waste discharge could violate the policy of the state, but unless
it would unduly violate that policy, a permit should issue nevertheless.
The amendment to this section in keeping with the general tenor of a
'
strengthened pollution control program deletes "unduly." 7
Several other minor changes were made. As previously mentioned,
the Washington APA now explicitly governs all rule making and contested cases before the Commission. 7 6 Although it was unnecessary,' 7
a new section was added to the act which designates the Commission as
...
Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 10.
171

Id.

Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 26.
Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 27.
17,WASH REV. CODE § 90.48.180
(1961).
175Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 16.
" Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 21.
" SeC WASH. REV. CODE § 90.48.153 (1961).
172

"
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the appropriate state agency for all purposes under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act.1
A further section of the amendments explicitly preserves all common law remedies against a polluter. 79 The
section should overrule a questionable holding of the two Rayonier
cases 8 0 that a person is not liable for damages from pollution if he
holds a valid waste discharge permit from the Commission and is not
violating it.
Significantly, the policy section of the act' 8 ' remains unchanged. The
legislature, by leaving this section in its original form, obviously concluded that the policy as enunciated in 1945 contained sufficient clarity
and breadth in directing the Commission's enforcement of the act.
Thus the Commission's position that the policy section provides a clear
mandate for a vigorous program of pollution abatement is, in 1967,
even more tenable than in 1962 when the pulp companies were emphasizing the language "consistent with... the industrial development
of the state." 82 It should be noted that the policy section authorizes
two complementary means of securing abatement. First, it requires the
best practicable treatment possible; if this is not done, no permit
should issue. Second, the section would prevent an operation from
merely treating a portion of its wastes in order to reduce discharge
below the water quality level set by the Commission for the adjoining
waters. It is apparent that if every operation did only this that the
Commission standards would be meaningless. Thus discharge must be
reduced to the lowest possible levels so that cumulative discharges
from all operations in the area will not violate the Commission standards. Even if the legislature is not presumed to have ratified all
administrative determinations when it amends part but not all of a
statute, it is clear in this case that the Commission's position must be
accepted because if the policy section were insufficient in light of the
increased powers, the legislature would have been derelict in not expanding the section to an appropriate policy.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Commission's record in its first two decades of operation is
unspectacular. By foregoing formal legal methods initially, the Commission may have avoided alienating industries and municipalities, and
Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 24.
Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 13, § 25.
's' Olympia Oyster Co. v. Rayonier, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Wash. 1964);
Ellison v. Rayonier, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 214 (W.D. Wash. 1957).
SWAsH. IEv. CODE § 90.48.010 (1961).
"=See note 95 supra.
'

"n
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certainly secured some abatement, but nevertheless there was marked
room for improvement.
The permit system, providing much of the necessary impetus for
abatement by smaller polluters, improved the record considerably.
However, the Commission actively pursued its program of cooperation
even when the governing statute allowed, and perhaps even demanded,
a more vigorous application. Thus, while portions of the pulp industry
rapidly complied with the policy of the state, companies in the northern
Puget Sound area remained recalcitrant about the financial investment
necessary to comply. This recalcitrance was demonstrated fully by
threats to move from the state and by their willingness to use all legal
means of securing delay.
Furthermore, little enforcement action has been instituted against
anyone since 1962.183 During this period, however, there has been a
substantial increase in the Commission's knowledge concerning the
effects of pollution; the federal government enacted legislation requiring standards for interstate waters; and new state legislation has
strengthened the Water Pollution Control Act. These factors brighten
184
the outlook for the future.
Less significant polluters, who tend to conform to the state's policy
without much overt resistance, now have the added incentive of the
new penalty provision to continue to comply with the policy. Significant polluters will be faced with extensive data gained since 1962, the
necessity of the Commission enforcing the federal standards, as well as
a significant tax incentive for constructing pollution abatement facilities. Municipalities will be assisted by the new state grant program,
although additional funds are necessary, and hopefully in the near
future the Commission will use its new authority to create sewage
basin plans including all municipalities within an area. Success in the
future, however, will not be possible absent a vigorous application of
the Water Pollution Control Act by the Commission.18 5 The Commis"Since early 1966, however, the Commission has instituted several administrative actions to terminate permits. Interview with the Honorable Charles B. Roe, Jr.,
supra note 47.
184Another factor which will assist enforcement activities is the phenomenal
increase in the Commission's operating budget over the previous biennium. Previously it was $599,776, (see Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1965, ch. 169, § 1); it is now
$1,410,015. The latter figure is based on subtracting $2.5 million (state matching
money) from the 1967 appropriation. See Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1967, ch. 143, § 1.
" Professor Galbraith's enlightening but disquieting thesis in THE NEW INDUSTIRIAL STATE (1967) supports the conclusion that a vigorous enforcement of the Act is
essential. If the cost of new facilities to the pulp companies will be in the nature of
$40-50 million, see text accompanying note 93 supra, then two of Professor Galbraith's
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sion's record for its first two decades demonstrates that abatement and
compliance can not be achieved by mere cooperative and token enforcement methods alone.
ADDENDUM

On October 6, 1967 the Joint Federal-State Conference was reconvened, and it accepted the recommendations of the five-year
study. 8 6 The recommendations will be forwarded to the Secretary of
the Interior for approval before being enforced by the state.8 7
Immediately following the Conference, the companies inflated their
cost of compliance estimate to $90 million.'
The figure was undoubtedly chosen for shock value; at no previous time had any estimate exceeded $50 million.' 89 The companies now indicate they will
seek a court test before taking any major steps to comply with the
recommendations. 9 0 Thus, assuming three years for a final Supreme
Court decision, it will be at least eight years before the state secures
adequate treatment for pulping wastes.
L. A. Powe, Jr.*
main criteria of the mature corporation, sufficient capital for continued expansion

and failure to identify with aesthetic values, reinforce the companies' decision to
resist compliance with the Act. I am assuming that most of the pulp companies
involved are mature corporations, but even if they are not Professor Galbraith's
thesis would apply in this case.
'See note 5 supra. The companies will have five years to comply with the recommendations.
2" The federal government could enforce the recommendations, but if the state is
willing to do so, it is unlikely the federal government would intervene. See text
accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
I Seattle Times, Oct. 6, 1967, at 56, col. 4; Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Oct. 7, 1967,
at 1, col. 3-4.
"I See note 93 supra and accompanying text. The new estimate is unbelievable
since exactly one month before the same mill spokesman estimated the cost of complying to the same recommendations at $40 million. Seattle Times, Sept. 6, 1967,
at 31, col. 2.
"D°An administrative hearing will precede the court test, and the companies will
undoubtedly rely on the same legal issues discussed in text accompanying notes 95-118
supra.
A mill spokesman stated that the companies "need better guidelines from an
impartial source [i.e., a court] as to how much power a group like this [the Conference] has." Seattle Post-Inteligencer, Oct. 7, 1967, at 1, col. 3-4. If the state enforces
the recommendations the statement is inaccurate. In that case the five-year study
would be introduced as evidence, and the recommendations will be adopted as the
Commission's order at an administrative hearing. Thus the issue will be the Commission's, not the Conference's power. The spokesman's statement is proper if the federal
government enforces the recommendations, but in that case the companies will learn
the Conference has more than adequate statutory power. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 466g(d)
(1) (Supp. 1966).
* 3d year law student, Univ. of Washington. The author wishes to express his
appreciation to the Honorable Charles B. Roe, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General for
Water Resources, for providing information which might not otherwise have been
available.
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APPENDIX
Some of the Uses to be Protected by the Federal Standards
Watercourse Classification

Uses
AA

A

B

C

FM
FM
F

FM
FM
F

FM
FM

FM

F
F
FM
FM
M

F
F
FM
FM
M

F
F
FM
FM
M

Wildlife

FM

FM

FM

Recreation
Water Contact
Boating and Fishing
Environmental Aesthetics

FM
FM
FM

FM
.FM
.FM

FM
FM
FM

FM
FM

Water Supply
Domestic
Industrial
Agricultural

F
FM
F

F
FM
F

FM
F

FM
F

Navigation

FM

FM

FM

FM

Log Storage & Rafting

FM

FM

FM

FM

Hydro-Power

F

F

F

F

Fisheries
Salmonoid
Migration
Rearing
Spawning
Warm AWater Game Fish
Rearing
Spawning
Other Food Fish
Commercial Fishing
Shellfish

F-Fresh Water; M-Marine Water
Source: Water Quality Standards for Interstate and Coastal Waters, Pollution Control Comn'n Regulation, June 29, 1967, at 16.

